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The paper adresses the relationship between ontological realism 
and Putnam’s thesis of conceptual relativity. The paper divides into 
three parts. The first part aims to reconstruct the notion of 
conceptual relativity, focusing on Putnam’s example involving 
mereological principles of individuation of objects. The second 
part points to some major shortcomings of the mereological 
example of conceptual relativity and then moves to a different 
version of conceptual relativity, which targets objects posited by 
mature scientific theories. I claim that the mereological and the 
scientific version of conceptual relativity are different in important 
respects and that two main types of conceptual relativity therefore 
need to be distinguished. In the third part, I show that conceptual 
relativity is not in tension with realism. More specifically, 
conceptual relativity is not in tension with “realism in 
metaphysics” that Putnam adopted in the last decade before his 
death. !
Keywords: Hilary Putnam, conceptual relativity, realism, optional 
languages !!!!
1. Conceptual relativity: The Case of Mereology !
Although Putnam never ceased to be an ontological realist, believing in 
the realm of mind-independently constituted objects, he was relentlessly 
pointing out unclarities of realistic metaphysics. In this section, I will 
introduce the curious phenomenon of “conceptual relativity” (Putnam’s 
coinage), which calls into question one of the assumptions of an 
uncritical form of realism. 
First, un peu d’histoire. In the period from mid seventies to late eighties,  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Putnam was advocating “internal realism”, which was in opposition to 
“Metaphysical Realism” (based on the presumption of unique 
correspondence relation between words and a fixed “ready-made” world 
of external things and properties).  Apart from the emphasis on the 1
epistemic notion of truth and its concomittant idea of idealized rational 
acceptability, internal realism had a distinctly constructivist flavour. 
Internal realist holds that we, human beings, “cut up the world into 
ob j ec t s when we in t roduce one o r ano the r s cheme o f 
description” (Putnam 1981, 52). Objects thus conceived are scheme-
dependent. They are logically mind-dependent: their existence implies 
existence of a mind using one or another conceptual scheme. Putnam 
later recanted these verificationist and constructivist notions and came to 
adopt a more traditional realist position. That is, he accepted that there 
can be truths that outstrip all our means of verifying them and rejected all 
constructivist talk about the mind “making” the world. After adopting 
“direct realism” in the philosophy of perception from the early nineties 
onwards (Putnam 1994a), he eventually embraced “realism in 
metaphysics” in his most recent writings on realism, starting with the 
lecture From Quantum Mechanics to Ethics and Back Again (delivered in 
2007; reprinted in Putnam 2012; see also Putnam 2016a, 24–27). There 
is, however, one assumption of Metaphysical Realism that Putnam never 
accepted. It’s the idea that there is only one correct and complete 
description of reality. Putnam’s late brand of realism embraces the 
possibility to describe the world correctly in different ways; in a word, it 
embraces conceptual relativity. 
Conceptual relativity, “the heart of internal realism” (Putnam 1991, 404) 
thus survived the collapse of other ingredients of internal realism. It 
reappears in Putnam’s more recent writings such as Putnam (2004) or 
Putnam (2012). Conceptual relativity is to be distinguished from 
conceptual pluralism, another tenet adopted by Putnam. Conceptual 
pluralist draws attention to cases in which two quite distinct schemes, 
such as the scheme of particle physics and the ordinary language of chairs 
and tables, describe the same portion of reality – say, the furniture in a 
study. On this view, the talk of chairs and tables truly describes what is 
out there and should not be seen as inferior to the physical description of 
the same portion of reality; science is not the only discourse which states 
“the facts” (Putnam 1994b, 243; Putnam 2004, 48). Putnam, of course, 
admits that chairs and tables are composed of particles described by 
physics. These different schemes, however, deal with different “levels of 
reality”. For this reason, everyday claims are not reducible to the 
statements of physics. In most radical cases of conceptual plurality, we 
cannot even conceive how we would go about reducing one description 
into another: think of physical theory and literary criticism. Conceptual  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plurality thus involves irreducible but compatible descriptions of the 
same states of affairs. The reverse is true of conceptual relativity. 
The doctrine of conceptual relativity most centrally consists in the claim 
that “in certain cases what exists may depend on which of various 
conventions we adopt” (Putnam 2004, 39). Sometimes we can describe 
the same state of affairs in two different ways and it’s not possible to 
conjoin the two descriptions, because the result would be incoherent. In 
these cases, there is no fact of the matter as to which of the descriptions is 
really right and nothing is necessitating the choice of one of the 
descriptions over the other. These non-conjoinable but correct 
descriptions, though, are only “incompatible at face value”. There is no 
genuine incompatibility between them, for the statements can be 
converted into each other. Yet, they do not preserve the same “ontology”: 
they do not see the world as composed of exactly the same objects. Thus, 
conceptual relativity encroaches on basic ontological notions such as 
“object”. 
The best way to get a grip on Putnam’s idea is to look at his examples of 
conceptual relativity. The one most frequently used by Putnam, to be 
found in his (1987) and various other writings, in various variants, 
concerns mereology and its way of individuating objects – a way that 
contrasts with more familiar individuating strategies. Imagine a mini 
world – “Carnapian world” in Putnam’s terms – consisting of just three 
individuals, x1, x2 and x3. According to most of us, I guess, the 
Carnapian world consists of precisely three objects. However, suppose 
that “Polish Logician”, a champion of mereology, looks at the same 
world.  In his view, it consists of seven, not three objects. These are, 2
respectively: 
x1, x2, x3, x1 + x2, x1 + x3, x2 + x3, x1 + x2 + x3. 
Who is right, then? How many objects really are there in the Carnapian 
world? Putnam insists that these questions have no sense. We cannot 
determine the number of objects in the world before it is established 
which conceptual apparatus we are drawing on in counting the objects. 
Once the apparatus is fixed, the question concerning the number of 
objects acquires a clear meaning and can be answered. Whether we talk 
“atomistically” or mereologically is a matter of choice. The Carnapian 
world doesn’t dictate to us in which scheme it should be described. 
Now, the two statements concerning the number of objects certainly 
aren’t mutual translations of each other in the ordinary sense in which 
“There are three objects in the Carnapian world” and “Il y a trois objets  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dans le monde carnapéen” are mutual translations. But the two sentences 
from the alternative conceptual schemes are “in deep mutual 
relation” (Putnam 1987, 20). To begin with, there is a simple procedure of 
converting the number of atomistic objects into the number of 
mereological objects: if the number of atomistic objects is n, then the 
number of mereological objects is 2n – 1. The existence of such a method 
of “translation” is an essential feature of conceptual relativity: Putnam 
rejects the picture of two correct but not convertible descriptions of the 
world (Putnam 1983, 40). Consider another mereological variant of 
conceptual relativity featuring alternative predicates, viz. the colours of 
objects (Putnam 1990, 98f.). Suppose that x1 is red and x2 black. The 
mereologist will claim that the Carnapian world contains an object which 
is partly red and partly black (i. e., x1 + x2). The atomist will deny this 
(provided, that is, that x3 is not partly red and partly black). There is, 
though, a method of interpreting the Polish Logician’s sentence “There is 
an object which is partly red and partly black” in the atomistic scheme: 
„There is an object which is red and a different object which is black“. 
Both sentences correctly describe the same state of affairs. In this 
manner, we could reinterpret all colour attributions of one scheme in the 
other one. This reinterpretability of alternative descriptions generalizes 
across the board to all cases of conceptual relativity, whatever their 
subject matter. 
Technically put, the two alternative descriptions of the Carnapian world 
are “mutually relatively interpretable”. Theory T1 is relatively 
interpretable in T2 if there are formal definitions of the terms of T1 in the 
language of T2 with the property that, if we “translate” the sentences of 
T1 into the language of T2 by means of those definitions, then all 
theorems of T1 become theorems of T2. Two theories are mutually 
relatively interpretable if each is relatively interpretable in the other 
(Putnam 1983, 38). Mutual relative interpretation, though, as is clear 
from the above definition, concerns only the formal properties of two 
conceptual frameworks. In this formal fashion, two frameworks might be 
relatively mutually interpretable even if they deal with completely 
disparate domains – say, one is an axiomatic system of genetics while the 
other an axiomatic system of number theory (Putnam 1983, 38). This is 
not the case in Putnam’s mereological example. The atomistic statement 
and the mereological statement both describe the same domain, viz. the 
Carnapian world. The two descriptions are thus “cognitively equivalent” 
in the following sense: they are describing the same state of affairs and 
all their predictive and explanatory powers are equal. 
The notion of the shared domain of the two descriptions is a prerequisite 
of the superficial, “at face value” incompatibility of the descriptions. If 
the descriptions described different portions of reality, they would not be 
incompatible in any way and could be conjoined into a single true 
decription of the overarching WORLD (Lynch 1998, 29–30). But how to  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secure the same domain for the superficially incompatible schemes of 
description? 
Putnam is clearly aware of the need for a common domain of the two 
descriptions (see Putnam 1991, 406, and Putnam 1992, 185). At the same 
time, he occasionally qualifies the claim about the shared domain with 
scare quotes: he talks about “the ‘same’ world” (Putnam 1987, 20) and 
“(in some way) the ‘same facts’” (Putnam 1987, 29). But this can’t be 
right. The underlying reality common to both descriptions must really be 
the same, not just “as if” the same. Without this, the descriptions could 
not be incompatible, not even in the superficial sense Putnam has in 
mind. If the sentences “There are three objects” and “There are seven 
objects” describe domains that are in any respect different, they cease to 
be superficially incompatible.  3
But how can we flesh out the idea of the common domain? There cannot 
be a third, neutral description of the Carnapian world which would 
incorporate the two competing accounts, for this would dissolve 
conceptual relativity. Yet, if we fail to provide some scheme-independent 
route to common underlying reality, how can we claim that the two 
descriptions capture the same facts? All that has been produced are just 
two different renderings of what is – without ground – claimed to be the 
same state of affairs. Could sensory perception help us with this problem? 
It could, but it doesn’t seem to be necessary to fix the underlying state of 
affairs. In fact, I introduced the mereological example without drawing 
on sensory perception.  Therefore, I suggest that we grasp the fact that 4
the two descriptions describe the same domain – that we just “get it” – 
even if the descriptions themselves not only do not state that they share a 
domain but they even appear to be incompatible. This is an important 
result. It shows that there are things we can say on the basis of the 
competing descriptions even if they are not explicitly contained in the 
descriptions themselves.  5
As to the idea of the incompatibility at face value, one could try to 
unpack it in the following way: the two sentences, “There are three 
objects in the Carnapian world” and “There are seven objects in the 
Carnapian world”, are incompatible only at first blush, because there is  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no such thing as “a ‘proposition’ which one of these sentences affirms 
and the other denies” (Putnam 1991, 404). When we look more closely, 
we realize that the word “object” doesn’t have the same meaning in both 
descriptions. Rather, its meaning is determined with the help of the 
relevant contextual parameter, viz. the framework adopted (atomistic vs. 
mereological). Relative to the atomistic scheme, “object” means 
something else than what the same word, syntactically speaking, means 
relative to the mereological scheme. The tension between the two 
descriptions vanishes into thin air. Both can be true at the same time. 
However, Putnam is adamant that this explanation is incorrect. It is 
wrong, he believes, to view the shift between the two descriptions as a 
shift in meaning. Rather, he suggests, what is involved is a difference in 
use of the term “object”. “The ordinary notion of ‘meaning’ was simply 
not invented for this kind of case” (Putnam 1991, 405). The two uses of 
the word “object” do not deserve two separate dictionary entries (Putnam 
1994a, 451f.). Putnam’s favorite example of this occasion-sensitivity of 
discourse involves coffee: think about the sentence “There is too much 
coffee on the table” used on occasions when there is (1) a number of 
mugs full of coffee on the table, (2) a lot of spilled coffee on the table and 
(3) a lot of bags of coffee beans on the table (Putnam 1999, 87–88). The 
extension of “coffee” is somewhat different in these three instances of 
“There is too much coffee on the table”, yet the core meaning of “coffee” 
is preserved in all of them. Thanks to this occasion-sensitivity, some 
concepts are semantically “extendable”. We need these “broad-spectrum 
notions” when we lack more precise terms and when we try to intelligibly 
explain those more precise terms while introducing them (Putnam 2012, 
68). According to Putnam, the notion of object is extendable in this sense. 
The atomist and the mereologist do not use different concepts of objects; 
they use the same concept in somewhat different ways.  6!
2. Beyond Mereology: Scientific Objects !
The argument for conceptual relativity from mereology will only work if 
we accept mereological scheme as a full-blown ontological alternative to 
atomism. But should we? There are reasons which count against such 
ontological tolerance. To begin with, Putnam himself notes that 
mereological ontology is profligate. It accepts all the objects accepted by 
the atomistic description and adds to them a couple of weird ones. This 
lavishness leads to unwelcome consequences. Suppose, to use Putnam’s 
example, that object a is a body of a lamp (including the bulb) and object  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b its detachable shade. Then, according to the mereological way of 
counting, the room contains the objects a, b and a + b. But since “a + b” 
stands for “bulb-containing body of a lamp plus its detachable shade”, the 
mereologist in fact claims that there are two lamps in the room – a claim 
that can be empirically disproven. Few of us are attracted to accepting 
such a realm of shadowy Doppelgängers.  7
Another complaint against mereological criteria of objecthood is due to 
Peter van Inwagen. It concerns the role of convention in ontology. 
Putnam’s claim that what there is is in some cases partly a matter of 
convention sounds just incredible to van Inwagen. To postulate, by fiat, 
that mereological sums exist is, in his eyes, equal to postulating that 
Golden Mountain exists. Thus van Inwagen firmly denies mereological 
ontology of the Polish Logician’s stripe: there just aren’t such objects as a 
mereological sum of a cat and a dog, he insists (van Inwagen 2002, 192). 
But even if we decided to include mereological sums into our inventory 
of what exists, they will still be in two respects importantly different from 
ordinary individuals. In the first place, sums can hardly be imagined to 
exist independently of a mind that assembles them. They thus violate 
Putnam’s requirement of logical independence, which, he claims, belongs 
to objects as conceived by realists. Sums do not exist in the same mind-
independent way as ordinary objects. Secondly, if I read Putnam 
correctly, the existence of mereological sums is based on ontological 
convention, but the existence of ordinary objects is not. In fact, I am not 
sure what would be the ontological convention for ordinary objects. To 
call an object object? I don’t believe it would occur to anyone to call this 
a convention. The mereological ontological convention, on the other 
hand, is clear enough: for every x and every y there is their mereological 
sum z = x + y (Raatikainen 2001, 172). Ontological convention thus 
concerns only what Jennifer Case calls “optional languages” (Case 1997). 
A natural language such as English can harbour any number of optional 
languages which are (temporarily) adopted for specific purposes. 
Optional language is an extension of some more basic language. In the 
case at hand, mereological description is a consciously adopted extension 
of the more basic atomistic description. Putnam endorses this view in 
(Putnam 1994a, 451n13); in (Putnam 2012, 57f.) he adds that the 
existence of mereological sums is conventional in the sense that all facts 
can be expressed with or without them. 
Consider now yet another objection to mereological ontology, due to 
Smith (2004, 79): mereological sums (Smith calls them “junk 
particulars”), such as the sum of my nose and of the Eiffel Tower, do not 
instantiate universals standing to other universals in relations captured by 
scientific laws. Therefore, they are not in all respects equal to atomistic  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objects, which do instantiate universals standing to other universals in 
relations captured by scientific laws. Again: mereological sums are 
importantly different from ordinary objects and if Putnam’s arguments for 
conceptual relativity were based solely on them, we would have good 
grounds to question their relevance for ontology. But mereological sums 
are only the most well-known example of conceptual relativity. Putnam 
has other examples to offer. Take geometrical points. These, Putnam tells 
us, can either be seen as concrete particulars occupying a portion of 
space-time, or as “mere limits” (for technical details, see Putnam 1992, 
217n14). Similarly, a theory which represents the physical interactions 
between bodies in terms of action at a distance and a physical theory 
which represents them in terms of fields may both be right (Putnam 1990, 
40); or: relative to one conceptual framework of fundamental physics, 
reality consist of physical particles, relative to a different framework it 
consists of fields (Putnam 1992, 121). In his most recent writings, 
Putnam favored yet another example of conceptual relativity taken from 
scientific practice: statements about bosons and statements about 
fermions can be taken as two equivalent represenations of the same 
quantum mechanical system – the physicists call this phenomenon 
“duality”. Informally put, there are known ways to convert statements 
talking about fermions into statements about bosons, and vice versa. 
Putnam claims that examples of conceptual relativity are ubiquitous in 
mathemathical physics (2012, 63). I will stick with bosons and fermions. 
A quantum field model constructed with fermions is “bosonized” (in a 
specified number of spacetime dimensions) when it is reformulated in 
terms of a model which is equivalent but constructed exclusively from 
bosons. By the same token, a system consisting solely of bosons can be 
“fermionized”. From the mid seventies a number of different 
mathematical techniques emerged that allow for such transformations. 
This is surprising, given that bosons and fermions have very different 
properties. They, crucially, differ in their spin quantum numbers. 
Fermions such as neutrons and quarks have half-integer spins, while 
bosons (pi mesons, photons etc.) have integral spins. As a consequence of 
this, systems containg fermions behave in different ways than systems 
containing bosons. E. g., bosons can all be in the same quantum state. 
Fermions can’t: Pauli exclusion holds for them, and if this were not so, 
periodic table of elements would look very different. Fermions are matter 
particles while bosons are force carriers. And so on. 
Despite all these differences in their ontologies and “ideologies” (i.e., the 
predicates used), bosonic and fermionic schemes of description preserve 
all observations and can account for them in fully equivalent ways. Now, 
as we have observed, from the possibility of construing new schemes of 
individuation à la Polish Logician it just does not follow that they are 
equally good representations of the external states of affairs as any old 
vocabulary. But the case of peculiar objects populating quantum physical  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theories is different. Undeniably, cases such as fermion to boson 
conversion do exist in science. Fermions and bosons do not fall prey to 
Smith’s objection, for they do instantiate universals standing to other 
universals in relations captured by scientific laws. And we cannot just 
dismiss either fermions or bosons in the way that van Inwagen dismissed 
mereological sums. 
The differences between the two examples of conceptual relativity, 
mereological and quantum mechanical, are not accidental, but reflect a 
deeper, systematic dissimilarity. I submit that we need to distinguish two 
types of conceptual relativity. In the CR1 type, one of the alternative 
languages is optional, in Case’s sense. Mereological example is of this 
type, because the individuating scheme of mereology is adopted via a 
special ontological convention. In CR2 cases, neither of the languages is 
optional. Bosons and fermions, together with other concepts used in 
physics and elsewhere, fall under this second type of conceptual 
relativity. Bosons and fermions are both fully self-standing, ontologically 
speaking. None of them is an optional extension of some other, more 
basic notion. Bosons are not just variants of fermions, or vice versa.  8
There are other divergences between the two types of conceptual 
relativity. Most importantly, the fermion–boson duality does not conform 
to the relativity-of-use template characteristic of the mereology example 
(and possibly other cases of CR1). This is the schematization of the use 
relativity in the mereological example: relative to the relativizer Γ 
(atomistic scheme of individuation), the word “object” is used in a way α; 
relative to Δ (Polish Logician’s scheme of individuation), the same word 
is used in a way β. The word “object” preserves its core meaning on both 
occasions of use, although Γ-objects and Δ-objects somewhat differ. In 
contrast with this, “boson” and “fermion” are two words with distinct 
meanings, fixed by the physical theory. No “extendability” of concepts 
and no “incompatibility at face value” is at work here. !
3. Conceptual Relativity and Realism !
Despite the differences between the two types of conceptual relativity, 
CR1 and CR2, statements of physical theory about bosons and statements 
about fermions are “mutually relatively interpretable”; they are two 
different ways of describing the same situations. This is the core of 
conceptual relativity, as conceived by Putnam. We should, therefore, 
accept Putnam’s quantum mechanical example and other cases of CR2 as 
bona fide instances of conceptual relativity, even if they do not conform 
to the relativity-of-use template and even if there is nothing conventional  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about the existence of fermions or bosons. We have a genuine choice 
whether to describe the same quantum mechanical system either as 
composed of fermions or as composed of bosons. 
This fact, on the face of it, is more disconcerting then the suggestion that 
objects can be individuated atomistically or mereologically – that there is 
no philosophically priviledged sense of “object”, as Putnam put it 
(Putnam 1995, 303). Is it not deeply puzzling that we can swap two quite 
different objects for each other while describing the very same part of 
external reality? Isn’t the physical reality itself to a certain extent 
indeterminate because of this? Not according to Putnam. He points out 
that according to the physicists, the possibility of boson-for-fermion 
exchange shows that the ontology of the quantum mechanical theory of a 
particular system is not the “load-bearing aspect” of the quantum 
mechanical scheme (Putnam 2012, 57). The quantum mechanical scheme 
has alternative “representations”, including the fermionic and the bosonic 
representation. The conclusion that Putnam and the physicists draw from 
this is that bosons and fermions are “simply artifacts of the representation 
used” (Putnam 2012, 64). So the picture is this. There is an underlying 
quantum reality. It is constituted independently of all our observations, 
schemes of decriptions etc. We devise concepts in order to variously 
describe this independent reality. This is a constructive activity, but it 
does not affect what is described (Putnam 2012, 62). The concepts 
devised are of such a nature that in certain cases we can swap one for 
another while not disturbing the equivalence of the alternative 
descriptions and the fact that the same state of affairs is described by both 
of them. 
What justifies Putnam in holding that the same quantum mechanical 
system is described by bosonic and fermionic scheme? This is the same 
worry that the mereological example of the CR1 variety had to face. But 
in the case of the fermions and bosons it is, I believe, more difficult to 
come up with a satisfactory answer to the question concerning the 
sameness of domain of both quantum mechanical descriptions. The 
reason is that the behavior of a bosonic system is so different from the 
behavior of a fermionic system. Putnam didn’t see this as a challenge. 
According to him, we just know that nothing in physical reality is 
changed when we move from one quantum mechanical description to 
another; all that changes pertains to the representation of the system. But 
do we know this? The fact of mutual interpretability of the descriptions is 
not a decisive argument for the sameness of their domain, for this 
interpretability could be purely formal: both descriptions could, in fact, 
describe different portions of physical reality. I don’t know how to 
answer the common-domain worry in the case of fermions and bosons. 
Note, however, that since the two descriptions are not incompatible in 
any respect, even if the assumption of the shared domain was threatened, 
this would not undermine the scientific realism Putnam espouses. That is, 
even if we are unable to fix the common domain, this is only a problem  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for conceptual relativity itself (for it needs the common domain as one of 
its prerequisites). It is therefore incumbent on the defenders of conceptual 
relativity to find a way of securing the common domain of alternative 
scientific descriptions. 
I conclude that instances of CR2, exemplified in this paper by bosons and 
fermions, do not constitute a genuine challenge to realistic metaphysics 
of independently constituted objects and states of affairs. We do not 
choose what exists, we only choose how to describe what exists anyway. 
This is good news for advocates of realism. We can disentangle 
conceptual relativity from ontological constructivism with which it was 
aligned when it was formulated in the eighties in Putnam’s writings. Later 
Putnam firmly rejects the “Internal Realist General Ontological Thesis: 
The world consists of theory-dependent objects” (Gardiner 2000, 146). 
In one of the many retrospective summaries of his changing conceptions 
of realism, Putnam writes that there are aspects of reality unaffected by 
human interests and constructions, such as the fact that there are 
thousands different species of ants in the world. These aspects would 
have remained unaffected even if humans didn’t devise the label “ant”, 
and indeed even if no humans with their concepts ever came into 
existence (Putnam 1994a, 448n7). The same holds with respect to the 
concepts of mature science such as “fermions” and “bosons”. 
Putnam’s conceptual relativity is thus fully compatible with the principles 
of realistic metaphysics.  This annihilates the appeal of conceptual 9
relativity for genuine ontological relativists. In a nutshell, genuine 
ontological relativists argue that „Soandso’s exist“ are to be understood 
as a claim that „Soando’s exist relative to a particular conceptual 
scheme”, as Nicholas Wolterstorff put it (Wolterstorff 1987, 239). From 
the epistemological point of view, Putnam’s claim is not that we cannot 
ever get to the objects themselves; the claim is that sometimes we can get 
to them in different ways. This element of choice does not usher in 
constructivism: external physical reality is not an amorphous blob 
waiting to be cut up by us in various ways. It is ready-made, consisting of 
self-demarcated objects, properties and relations. Our perceptions, 
together with the very fact of the perfect mutual interpretability of the 
rival descriptions of the same states of affairs and events, confirm this 
inherent structuredness of reality. 
We could express the same point by saying that nature dramatically 
limits, or controls, our ways of describing it. But wait, wasn’t Putnam 
criticizing the idea of One True Description of the world? Indeed he was. 
However, his examples of conceptual relativity dislodge One True 
Description only when this idea is taken literally – as a description 
permitting no alternative expression whatsoever. In fact, probably no one  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is prepared to commit to such an extreme idea. Even staunch realists like 
John Searle (1995) and Robert Kirk (1999) admit that there might be 
variations in the correct descriptions of the world underlying all 
descriptions. A more liberal understaning of One True Description is 
therefore to be preferred. There is just one such decription, but some 
portions of it can be expressed in alternative, though mutually 
convertible, ways. 
As to whether Putnam’s arguments dislodge the idea of a complete 
description of the world, which was a part and parcel of Metaphysical 
Realism he was rejecting, the following observation is in order. Leaving 
aside the worry that the idea of a complete description of anything, let 
alone of all reality, is meaningless (Hacking 1983, 93), what is 
incomplete about, say, the atomistic description of the Carnapian world? 
Shall we say it is incomplete because it leaves out the mereological sums 
of objects? This would be confused. In its own way, the atomistic 
description captures all there is to the Carnapian world. According to the 
mereologist, the same world can be captured in a different way, but that 
doesn’t mean that the atomistic description is incomplete, that it leaves 
anything out while specifying the number of objects in the Carnapian 
world. The same holds for the fermion/boson duality and other instances 
of CR2. There might be another sense in which the decriptions are 
incomplete, but Putnam never specified it. I thus submit that conceptual 
relativity per se does not undermine the possibility of completeness of 
One True Description of reality (liberally understood). !
4. Conclusion !
Symbolically, Putnam’s last published paper deals with the subject of 
realism (Putnam 2016b). I say symbollically because realism was one of 
Putnam’s philosophical preoccupations for decades. He was unique in 
thinking through aspects of realism that other philosophers (and 
scientists) were taking for granted. His writings on conceptual relativity 
are a prime example of this. The central insight of these writings – that 
we can describe the same state of affairs in somewhat different ways – is 
important, although both actual and imagined instances of conceptual 
relativity are confined to special contexts, leaving most of both 
commonsense and scientific discourse untouched. 
Putnam’s grapplings with realism are instructive: after experimenting 
with various forms of realism, he finally settled on straightforward 
metaphysical realism, albeit one that is compatible with various forms of 
conceptual relativity. In closing, I will quote the words of David Lewis 
who, it seem to me, captured the fruits of Putnam’s tenacious rethinking 
of realism: 
It is the profession of philosophers to question platitudes that others  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accept without thinking twice. A dangerous profession, since 
philosophers are more easily discredited than platitudes, but a 
useful one. For when a good philosopher challenges a platitude, it 
usually turns out that the platitude was essentially right; but the 
philosopher has noticed trouble that one who did not think twice 
could not have met. In the end the challenge is answered and the 
platitude survives, more often than not. But the philosopher has 
done the adherents of the platitude a service: he has made them 
think twice (Lewis 1969, 1). 
In Putnam’s case, the platitude in question was the view that external 
things out there really exist independently of all our perceptual and 
cognitive contributions. Over decades and even centuries, this platitude 
proved suprisingly difficult to defend, with many clever thinkers 
advocating its exact opposite. In the thesis of conceptual relativity, 
Putnam put his finger on what is worthwile in the complaints of some of 
the critics of straightforward realism, while cutting off the philosophical 
deadwood.  10!!!
REFERENCES !
Case, J. 1997. On the Right Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. The Southern 
Journal of Philosophy 35 (1): 1–18. 
Clark, P. and B. Hale, eds. 1994. Reading Putnam. Oxford: Blackwell. 
De Caro, M. and D. Macarthur, eds. 2012. Philosophy in an Age of 
Science. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
De Caro, M., ed. 2016. Hilary Putnam: Naturalism, Realism, and 
Normativity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Gardiner, M. Q. 2000. Semantic Challenges to Realism. Dummett and 
Putnam. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Goodman, N. 1978. Ways of Worldmaking. Indianapolis: Hackett. 
Hacking, I. 1983. Representing and Intervening. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Horgan, T. and Timmons, M. 2002. Conceptual Relativity and 
Metaphysical Realism. Philosophical Issues 12, Realism and 
Relativism: 74–96.  
35
 I thank two anonymous reviewers for their careful reading of the manuscript and for 10
their insightful comments and suggestions.
Tomáš Marvan
!
Kirk, R. 1999. Relativism and Reality. A Contemporary Introduction. 
London and New York: Routledge. 
Lewis, D. 2002. Convention: A Philosophical Study. Second edition. 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Lynch, M. 1998. Truth in Context. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. 
Putnam, H. 1981. Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
––––––. 1983. Realism and Reason. Philosophical Papers Volume 3. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
––––––. 1987. The Many Faces of Realism. La Salle: Open Court. 
––––––. 1990. Realism with a Human Face. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 
––––––. 1991. Reply to William Throop and Catherine Doran. Erkenntnis 
34 (3): 404–408. 
––––––.1992. Renewing Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 
––––––.1994a. Sense, Non-sense and the Senses. The Journal of 
Philosophy 91 (9): 445‒517. 
––––––.1994b. Simon Blackburn on Internal Realism. In Clark and Hale 
(eds.), 242–254. 
––––––.1995. Words and Life. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press. 
––––––.1999. The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body and World. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
––––––.2004. Ethics without Ontology. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 
––––––.2012. Philosophy in an Age of Science. In de Caro and Macarthur 
(eds.). 
––––––.2016a. Naturalism, Realism, and Normativity. In de Caro (ed.). 
––––––.2016b. Realism. Philosophy and Social Criticism 42 (2): 117–
131. 
Raatikainen, P. 2001. Putnam, Languages and Worlds. Dialectica 55 (2): 
167–174. 
Searle, J. 1995. The Construction of Social Reality. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Press. 
36
Conceptual Relativity Meets Realism in Metaphysics
!
Smith, B. 2004. Beyond Concepts: Ontology as Reality Representation. 
In Formal Ontology and Information Systems. Proceedings of 
FOIS 2004 – Third International Conference on Formal 
Ontology and Information Systems, eds. Achille Varzi and 
Laure Vieu. Amsterdam: IOS Press: 73–84. 
van Inwagen, P. 2002. The Number of Things. Philosophical Issues 12, 
Realism and Relativism: 176–196. 
Varzi, A. 2000. Mereological Committments. Dialectica 54 (4): 283–305. 
Wolterstorff, N. 1987. Are Concept-Users World-Makers?. Philosophical 
Perspectives 1, Metaphysics: 233–267.  
37
EuJAP | Vol. 12, No. 2, 2016
38
